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Econometrica, Vol. 53, No. 4 (July, 1985) 
PRODUCT QUALITY SIGNALING IN EXPERIMENTAL 
MARKETS 
BY Ross M. MILLER AND CHARLES R. PLOTT 
In a series of eleven markets, sellers possessed products that were exogenously designated 
as either grade "regular" or grade "super." Supers were valued more by buyers but grade 
could not be observed by buyers prior to purchase. Sellers could add costly units of quality 
to their products that were observable and valued by buyers. The data are analyzed with 
perfect information models, signaling equilibrium models, and pooling models. A variety 
of behaviors are observed across the eleven markets. Signaling is observed in most markets 
with some markets approaching the most efficient signaling equilibrium. Pooling or partial 
pooling occurs in a few markets. The performance seems to be sensitive to the relative cost 
of signaling and the market institutional setting. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A continuing area of research in economic theory is the role markets can play 
in transferring information from one agent to another. In the experimental markets 
studied in this paper, each seller is the only one who knows all of the relevant 
characteristics of each of the units of a commodity in his/her possession. If the 
information known to sellers was also known to buyers, it would affect the value 
buyers placed on the units. Consequently, sellers have an interest in affecting 
what buyers know. The work by Akerlof [1] suggests that price alone cannot be 
expected to convey accurately all information from sellers to buyers while also 
serving a market clearing function. Signaling theory as introduced by Spence [6] 
and Stiglitz [7] suggests circumstances in which market processes would allow 
buyers to extract the sellers' information even though sellers might want to mislead 
buyers. The experimental markets studied here were designed to explore this 
latter possibility. 
Theoretical discussions of signaling are focused on several issues. Equilibria 
may not be unique. With the Spence [6] formulation, for example, a continuum 
of equilibria may exist. On the other hand, nonexistence is also a problem 
(Rothschild and Stiglitz [5]), and the discussion of these issues is generally 
sensitive to the number of agents (Riley [3]) and the definitions of equilibrium 
(Wilson [8]; Riley [4]). Notions of reputation, gaming, and other aspects of belief 
structures are also important. Motivated by this literature, our research strategy 
was first to design markets in which several competing models can be legitimately 
applied and then to evaluate the models in light of the results. 
In addition to questions regarding the relative accuracy of models, several 
questions of a qualitative nature are posed as implicit features of the overall 
experimental design. Participants in these markets knew much less than is 
frequently assumed as part of standard models. Each individual knew only his/her 
own parameters. The costs of signals to sellers and the value of signals to buyers, 
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838 ROSS M. MILLER AND CHARLES R. PLOTT 
for example, were not public information. No participant was aware of any of 
the theory of signaling. Under such circumstances will individuals become aware 
of the value of the potentials of signals? If each quality level of a product can 
command a different price, the number of markets must equal the number of 
levels of signals. If so many markets are open, will the standard demand and 
supply ideas work? How are multiple markets to be organized? The theory does 
not provide an operational way of determining the informational content of 
potential signals, so part of the paper reports on attempts to give the concept of 
a signal a satisfactory context. 
Sellers in these markets possessed commodities that were exogenously desig- 
nated as either of grade "regular" or grade "super." The latter was valued more 
by the buyers but grade could not be observed by buyers prior to purchase. Sellers 
could add units of quality, which were valued by buyers and could be observed 
prior to purchase. The cost of adding quality to supers was lower than the cost 
of adding quality to regulars. Given these conditions the possibility of signaling 
existed. A detailed discussion of the nature of the markets including parameters 
and experimental procedures is in the next section. 
The third section of the paper introduces five competing models. The results 
are in the fourth section. Four questions are asked of the data in sequence. Does 
separation occur in the sense that the two grades can be identified statistically 
by the quality added by the seller? All signaling models predict an affirmative 
answer whereas certain pooling models predict a negative answer. Is separation, 
if it exists, due to signaling? The classical Walrasian model, for example, predicts 
separation but not because of signaling. Do the markets tend to equilibrate? If 
equilibrium signals are observed, which signaling equilibrium is the most 
appropriate? Both price data and profit data are used to explore these questions. 
Our answers to the above questions, which are detailed in the text, seem to 
depend upon variables that are not adequately addressed in the theory. A 
potentially important variable is the magnitude of difference in signaling costs. 
In markets in which a "substantial" difference exists between the signaling costs 
of the two basic grades, the system seems to move to near the most efficient 
signaling equilibrium. If the cost of signals is "too close," pooling seems to occur. 
We suspect that experience and an awareness of the potential information content 
of signals are important for signaling and the development of signaling equilibria. 
A dynamic element not suggested by existing models is detectable. These issues 
are all outlined in the fourth section. 
2. LABORATORY MARKETS 
Subjects were undergraduate students from Boston University, California 
Institute of Technology, and Pasadena City College. In addition, three markets 
involved high school students attending a Caltech summer science program. The 
subject pools for each of the eleven experiments are in Table I. A pilot experiment 
was also conducted but the results are not reported here. 
Subjects were recruited from classes and from dorms. They were told they 
would have an opportunity to earn money. Once subjects were seated in a 
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TABLE I 
EXPERIMENTAL PARAMETERS 
Buyers Sellers 
Base Redemption Marginal Quality 
Value Cost Dollars Chalkboard 
Experiment Subject 1st Unit per Colors 
Index poola Number Bonus Regular Super Number Regular Super Units Franc Experienceb Used 
2 CIT 4 1.00 .50 2.50 6 .15 .02 2 1 general no marketc n 
3 PCC 6 2.00 .50 2.50 6 .15 .02 2 1 none no 
4 CIT 4 1.75 .50 2.50 6 .15 .07 2 1 general no 
market 
(HS) 6 .60 .50 2.50 6 .15 .07 2 .40 no no 
6 (HS) 6 1.00 .50 2.50 6 .15 .02 2 .50 no no 
7 (CI 5 1T50 2.00 4.00 6 .15 .02 2 .25 yes period 11 thru (HS) .J tUAdfrom 5 & 6 period 18 
8 BU 5 1.00 .50 2.50 6 .15 .02 2 .50 none yes 
9 BU 2 1.50 2.00 4.00 6 .15 .02 2 .25 none yes 
10 BU 4 1.25 1.00 3.00 4 .15 .02 2 .40 yes yes from 8 &9ye 
11 CIT 6 1.50 2.00 4.00 6 .15 .02 2 .40 general yes 
market 
12 CIT 6 .60 .50 2.50 6 .15 .07 2 .40 yes yes from 11ye 
a Key: CIT-California Institute of Technology; PCC-Pasadena City College; BU-Boston University; HS-High School students. 
bExperience: when people were used in more than one experiment they remained in the same position as a buyer or seller. 
c General market: experienced from other experimental markets but not this series. 
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840 ROSS M. MILLER AND CHARLES R. PLOTT 
classroom with two large chalkboards, the instructions were distributed and read 
(see Appendix). A period zero was conducted without payment in order to check 
the subjects' understanding of the trading rules and accounting. The experiments 
typically lasted three hours after which subjects were paid. The procedure differed 
in experiments 11 and 12, in which the same subjects were used and paid for 
both sessions after the second. 
The experience of the subjects differed among the experiments. Caltech under- 
graduates had experience in laboratory markets but not this particular series, 
unless otherwise indicated below. All other subjects had no experience at all in 
laboratory markets aside from this series. In several experiments the subjects had 
participated in earlier experiments in this series. The object, of course, was to 
study markets in which participants were already familiar with the market tech- 
nology, accounting, etc. and could concentrate on the market itself. When subjects 
were used the second time, they were always assigned the same role, as a buyer 
or as a seller, that they had previously experienced. In all such experiments the 
parameters were changed as, contained in Table I. 
Preferences were induced in the following manner. Buyer i received a redemp- 
tion value Vi(g, q) for each unit purchased, which depended upon the grade, g, 
and the quality, q, of the unit. All buyers had identical redemption value functions 
but this fact was not public information. The general function was as follows, 
but subjects saw the discrete approximations in the Appendix which were used 
to reduce instruction difficulties. Since all buyers had the same redemption 
schedules the individual subscript is dropped. 
g E {R, S} {regular, super} is an index of the grade of the unit; 
q E [0, oo) is an index of the units of quality added by the seller; 
V(g, q) = G(g)+ Q(q); 
G(g) =|$2.50 if g=S, $.50 if g=R; 
{$.205q - $.005q2 if q <20, 
Q(q) $[(.205)(20) - (.005)(202)]+ $.01 q if q > 20. 
V(g, q) is the redemption value of each unit purchased. In addition, the buyer 
received a bonus (the amounts are in Table I) if at least one unit was purchased.2 
So, except for the first unit, each individual had a horizontal demand function 
at V(g, q) at all grades and qualities. Of course the buyer observes q but not g 
at the time of purchase. 
The markets proceeded in a sequence of periods. Each period each seller had 
exactly two units to sell so the total supply was fixed. The basic grades of the 
units held by an individual seller during a period were the same. Both were 
2 This provided some consumer's surplus and therefore some income for buyers should a competitive 
equilibrium be attained. In retrospect we think a flat payment per period might have been a better 
procedure. 
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regulars or both were supers. For each period the designation of sellers as holding 
regulars or supers was made randomly subject to the constraint that half of the 
sellers had supers and half had regulars. While the designation of sellers as supers 
or regulars was made prior to the experiment, an individual seller did not know 
his/her designation until just before the period began.3 
Sellers could add quality, q, to a unit at a cost which depended upon the grade 
of the unit. In all experiments the marginal cost of adding quality to regulars 
was constant at $.15. The marginal cost of adding quality to supers was always 
lower, at $.07, in experiments 4, 5, and 12 and $.02 in all other experiments. 
Quality could be added "to order" so the seller had no investment decisions. It 
was as if units were sold to contract and quality was added according to contract 
specifications after the sale. 
Figure 1 is a graph of the unit demand and cost value functions. As can be 
seen, the value between supers and regulars is a constant $2.00 for every level 
of quality. The total cost of a unit expressed as a function of quality is also 
graphed. Regulars always have a higher marginal cost than supers. The marginal 
cost of supers is the only financial parameter which varies across experiments. 
As can be seen in Table I, the unit of currency was an experimental medium 
called francs. The dollar value of francs varied across experiments. The experiment 
and individual incentives were explained to the subjects in terms of francs. The 
use of francs was incorporated to avoid a possible parameter bias when subjects 
were used in more than one experiment. For purposes of exposition, however, 
the discussion and analysis in the paper is in terms of dollars. 
The markets consisted of a series of days or trading periods. Each period was 
identical except the sellers who held supers were different as described above. 
Bids to buy were tendered by a buyer who would orally indicate his/her letter 
first, then the quality and then the value of the bid. For example, "H bids a 50 
at $6.00."4 This bid was written on the chalkboard, which had a horizontal quality 
scale line on it, below the line at the quality 50. The bid was repeated by the 
auctioneer, after which the floor was open for additional bids and offers. This 
bid remained until it was accepted or canceled. Offers to sell were announced 
verbally: "Q offers a 75 at $6.75." These were entered above the line at the proper 
quality and remained until accepted or canceled. Buyers and sellers could have 
many bids and offers outstanding, but sellers were required to cancel offers when 
they had no more units, since bids and offers were commitments to buy or sell. 
Acceptances could be made at any time and were finalized by the auctioneer, 
who entered the accepting party's number by the bid or offer and circled it as 
seen in Figure 2. 
3The incentive and record charts were stapled together so the chart for period n was not exposed 
until the chart for n - 1 was removed. 
4This sequence has certain logistical advantages. The buyer number first indicates who has the 
floor should the auctioneer need to call on someone in a tie. The word "bid" alerts the proper side 
of the market. The quality helps position the auctioneer at the proper location to write the price 
when (s)he hears it. The auctioneer verbally repeats the tender after it is written and then the floor 
is open for more bids and offers. This latter feature slows down the process and eliminates congestion 
and confusion. 
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600 REGULAR COST (0.1 
5000 
500 / REDEMP TION VALUE SUPER 12.501 )
400 - EXPECTED VALUE (NO INFORMATON 
30 - 
REDEMP TION VALUE REGULAR /0.501 
200 _ 
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(10, 3.50)N 
Q ( 10,3.50)N) (75,6.75)0 (10,4.00)X K (75,6.50 Y) 
(0,2.50)W ( 3.50)X) K (75,.50 
(0, 5.25) L C 10 3.50)Wj (F (75, 6.50) (10000)L 
(5, 3.50)N 
0-5-- 10-15- 20-25- 30- 35-40 -45- 50-55- 60-65-70-75- 80-85- 90-95- 100 
A(5,2.50) 
K (0,0.25) F(20,4.50) F(30,5.00) H (50,6.00) K (75,6.00) 
G(0,1.00) F(30,5.50) A (75,6.50iL 
KEY BUYER INDEX (QUALITY, DOLLARS) SELLER INDEX 
BIDS TO BUY ARE BELOW THE LINE 
OFFERS TO SELL ARE ABOVE THE LINE 
CONTRACTS ARE CIRCLED 
TEMPORAL SEQUENCE BEGINS NEAREST THE LINE 
FIGURE 2-Quality line in markets. 
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As contracts were made they were entered in sequence on a second chalkboard 
in the vector form (Buyer, Quality, Price, Seller). After the period was over the 
experimenter announced which sellers were selling regulars and supers so buyers 
could calculate their profits. This information was carried on the second chalk- 
board for as many periods back as possible. Thus subjects always had access to 
the relationship between qualities, prices, and grade from several previous periods. 
In addition, starting with period 11 of experiment 7, colored chalk was used 
to indicate which contracts were for regulars and which were for supers. At the 
end of a period, as units were indexed as being regulars and supers on the second 
chalkboard, the auctioneer circled the regulars with green chalk and the supers 
with red chalk on the primary chalkboard, which contained all bids, offers and 
contracts. Thus when the markets were separated the left hand side of the 
chalkboard, with low qualities, had green circled contracts and the right had red. 
As will be discussed in the final section, this feature was added after it appeared 
that many agents were unaware of the relationship between basic grade and 
quality even though it was obvious if the question were asked of the data they 
had. Many simply never asked the question or were too busy with other aspects 
of the market to look. 
3. MODELS 
Five models are to be examined. These will be discussed briefly. The prediction 
of each model, which may not be unique because of the integer nature of the 
payoff schedules, is listed in Table II. Several models examined here predict that 
all regulars will sell at the same price, PR, and that all supers will sell at the same 
price, PS. Furthermore, all models predict that the quality of regulars will be the 
same at qR and that the quality of all supers will be the same at qs. Of course 
these hypotheses themselves are subject to examination but they will simply be 
assumed in the discussions below. 
A. The Full Information Model 
Markets will behave as if buyers are fully informed about which sellers have 
regulars and which have supers. The model can rest on axioms which have sellers 
wanting a "reputation of honesty" perhaps because the repeated game nature of 
the market makes such reputations valuable; or because special signals develop 
in the complicated bidding market which convey this information; or because 
sellers have a preference for "honesty." The law of supply and demand can be 
applied directly' to obtain the following formal statements: 
(1) V(R, qR)-PR; 
(2) V(S,qS)=PS; 
5Experiments have not yet been conducted to check the accuracy of this model when the grades 
of the commodities are known before purchase. 
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TABLE II 
MODEL PREDICTIONS 
Experiment' 
Low Cost No. 2, 3, 6, 8 High Cost No. 4, 5, 12 
Quality Price (dollars) Quality Price (dollars) 
Rb sb R S R S R S 
Full Information [5,6] [18, 19] [1.40-1.55] [4.57-4.59] [5,6] [13, 14] [1.40-1.55] [4.32-4.39] 
Naive [5,6] [18, 19] [2.40-2.55] [3.57-3.59] [5,6] [13, 14] [2.40-2.55] [3.32-3.39] 
Polling (Most Efficient) 12 3.24 10 3.05 
Most Efficient Signaling and [5,6] 27 [1.40-1.55] 4.67 [5,6] 27 [1.40-1.55] 4.67 
Rothschild-Stiglitz 
Inefficient Signaling [5,6] 310>q [1.40-1.55] 4.67+.01 (Q-27) [5,6] 55>q [1.40-1.55] 4.67+.01 (Q-27) 
q>27 q>27 
For experiments 7, 9, and 11, add $1.50 to all low-cost dollar numbers. For experiment 10, add $.50 to all low-cost dollar numbers. Quality predictions remain unchanged. 
b R-Regular; S-Super. 
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() V(R,qR) aC(R,qR) 
(3)~~~~~3 dq aq 
(4) a V(S, qs) a C (S, qs) 
aq aq 
The first two simply say that price of the fixed supply is determined by the 
(horizontal) demand function. Equations (3) and (4) say that the value of 
additional quality is equal to the marginal cost of supply. Solutions to these 
equations for the parameters of this experiment are in Table II. 
B. The Naive Model 
Buyers may never notice that quality carries information about the underlying 
grade of the unit. Thus, they would treat the purchase as a lottery between the 
value of a regular and the value of a super at a given level of quality. The system 
of equations would be (5) and (6) below plus (3) and (4) above. The subjective 
probabilities are determined by rational expectations. 
(5) Pr (R) V(R, qR) +Pr (S) V(S, qR) = PR; 
(6) Pr (R) V(R, Qs) + Pr (S) V(S, qs) = Ps. 
Rational Expectations: Pr (R) = Pr (S) =2- 
These simply say that price is determined by expected value. For the parameters 
of the experiment the predictions are in Table II. 
C. The Pure Pooling Models 
Pooling is a situation in which buyers cannot distinguish regulars from supers 
because the qualities are identical and from this it follows that prices are identical 
and buyers treat the purchase as a lottery. Sellers on the other hand believe that 
buyers will accept nothing other than the going quality. Thus equality of quality 
over all units as indicated in equation (7) and equality of price over all sales, 
as can be deduced from (7) and (9) or (7) and (10), define a pooling equilibrium 
at a price level indicated by (8). 
(7) qR= qs = q; 
(8) Pr (R) V(R, q) + Pr (S) V(S, q)=P; 
(9) PR-C(R, qR)= PS-C(R, qs); 
(10) PS - C(S, qs) = PR- C(S, qR). 
Rational Expectations: Pr (R) = Pr (S)-2. 
A glance at the model indicates that while the equations dictate relationships 
among observables, a unique price and quality is not determined. Many pure 
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pooling equilibria exist. The most efficient pure pooling equilibrium is that which 
maximizes consumer plus producer surplus subject to the above equilibrium 
conditions. This particular equilibrium is obtained by the addition of one more 
equation: 
aV(R, q) aV(S, q) aC(R, q) iaC(S, q) 
+ = - +-. 
aq aq aq aq 
The solutions for the experimental parameters are in Table II. 
D. The Partial Pooling Model 
Partial pooling relaxes the requirement that all units trade at a single quality 
to include the possibility that units trade at two qualities. At one quality, qR, only 
grade R units are traded and at another quality, qm, both grades are traded in 
a "mix" of grades. The two qualities trade at prices PR and PM respectively. 
(l l) PR - V(R, qR) x(R, qR) =O0; 
(12) Pr (RIqM) V(R, qM) + Pr (SIqM) V(S, qM) = PM; 
(13) PR- C(R, qR) = PM- C(R, qM); 
(14) PM -C(S, qM) - PR -C(S, qR)- 
Equations (11) and (12) indicate that prices should increase to the demand price 
which in the case of (12) reflects the uncertainty. Equation (13) indicates that 
the holders of regulars are indifferent between selling at the two grades. Equation 
(14) indicates that holders of supers may sell all units at qM. The major unspecified 
variables are the probabilities in (12). The natural principle to apply is the 
"Principle of Rational Expectations" which in this case is 
(15) Pr(SI qM)= ) 1 and Pr(R|qM)+Pr(S|qM)=1. IRI+ISI 
The partial pooling model, if (15) is included, specifies a price for any given pair 
(qR, qM). However, the model does not dictate a pair (qR, qM). So partial pooling 
equilibria can be identified only through the relationships indicated by the 
equations applied. 
E. Most Efficient Signaling Equilibrium and Rothschild-Stiglitz 
Signaling equilibria are those for which buyers are aware that there is a 
relationship between quality and grade.6 Thus, observing the quality they know 
the grade for certain. Sellers on the other hand have no incentive to change the 
quality they are offering given the grade. Generally many levels of quality will 
have these properties and will thus be signaling equilibria. The most efficient is 
6 The notion of a signaling equilibrium used in this paper is more in accordance with the strong 
conditions put forward by Stiglitz [7] than the weaker conditions of Spence [6]. The pooling and 
partial pooling models are consistent with Spence's weaker notion of signaling equilibrium. 
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the one that maximizes consumer plus producer surplus. Find a (PR, PS, qR, qS) 
which maximizes: 
max 6V[(R, qR)-C(R, qR)]+6V[(S, qS)-C(S, qS)] 
subject to: 
(16) V(R, qR)= PR; 
(17) V(S, qs)=,Ps; 
(18) PR- C(R, qR) -PS- C(R, qs); 
(19) Ps - C(S, qS) - PR- C(S, qR)- 
The number 6 appears in the criterion function because there are six units of 
each grade, but of course this does nothing to the solution. For the parameters 
we use, equation (18) should be satisfied by equality at the most efficient signaling 
equilibrium (modulo the integer problem) and (19) should be a strong inequality. 
The solutions are in Table II. 
Rothschild and Stiglitz [5] suggest that conditions in addition to (16)-(19) may 
be necessary for an equilibrium to be achieved. Sellers may prefer a pooling 
equilibrium to a most efficient signaling equilibrium and thereby have an incentive 
to pool. Suppose q* and q* satisfy (16)-(19). An equilibrium in the Rothschild- 
Stiglitz sense would also satisfy either (20) or (21).7 That is, for all q, either 
(20) Ps - C(S, q*) > V(R, q)+2V(S, q) - C(S, q); 
or, 
(21) PR- C(R, q*)>2V(R, q)+!V(S, q) - C(R, q). 
The most efficient signaling equilibrium in the market parameters studied here 
satisfies condition (20) and is therefore a Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium as well.8 
F. Inefficient Signaling Equilibria 
The inefficient signaling equilibria are the solutions to (16) through (19) with 
the efficient solution removed. Equilibria computed on the assumption that the 
quality of regulars is the efficient quality are in Table II. In our parameters the 
profit equations (18) and (19) will both be strong inequalities at inefficient 
signaling equilibria. The only possible exception to the strong inequality occurs 
at the upper bound of qualities but for practical purposes such upper bounds do 
not exist. 
7These equations describe only pure pooling equilibria and not partial pooling. The discussion 
would remain essentially unchanged if the partial pooling possibilities were considered as well. 
8 Because (21) is always satisfied in our parameters, the inequality (20) can be used to define the 
quantity W = Ps- C(S, q*) -[2V(R q) +2V(S, q) - C(S, q)] with q chosen to minimize the 
expression. W is a measure of how "near" the market is to nonexistence of a Rothschild-Stiglitz 
equilibrium. As the marginal cost of adding quality of supers ranges over the values .02, .07, .095, 
.12, the pair (W, q) takes the respective values (.92, 19), (.37, 14), (0, 11), (-.43,9). Thus, the 
Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium is "closer" to nonexistence in the high-cost markets (.07) than in the 
low-cost markets (.02). 
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4. RESULTS 
A time series of statistics of all periods of all experiments is contained in 
Figures 3 through 6. We have included data for all periods because much market 
behavior that bears on the intuition which motivated the models introduced above 
is not captured by the models themselves and therefore is not completely represen- 
ted by summary statistics. In addition, all markets exhibit a process of convergence 
which we are unable to capture precisely. Thus, the time series itself is an important 
source of data which helps provide impressions of what is happening in the 
market beyond those contained in the conclusions below. 
Two aspects of the time series are graphed. The first is the excess value of a 
unit and the second is the quality of the unit. The per period mean values are 
in the graph. 
Excess value is developed from the following notions. Notice that V(R, q) 
places a lower bound on the redemption value a buyer can receive from a unit. 
Therefore, if a price P(q) is paid for a unity of quality q then 
x(q)= P(q)- V(R, q) 
is the maximum possible loss the buyer can face by purchasing a unit of quality 
q. If the complications caused by the existence of a first unit bonus are neglected, 
the quantity, x(q), is a reflection of the buyer's confidence that the unit is a super 
since it is the amount paid over the unit's value in case the unit is a regular. This 
quantity, x(q), is called the excess value of a unit of quality q. If x(q) > 0 the 
buyer thinks the unit is possibly an S. At a competitive equilibrium under full 
information or a signaling equilibrium x(q) = 0 for all R and x(q)= $2.00 for all 
S in all experiments. The naive equilibrium model predicts x(q)= $1.00 for all 
q and all experiments. 
Opportunity cost is a concept necessary to make the profit equations 
operational. Let B(g) be the set of observed price-quality pairs traded in the 
market for grade g units. The profit equations (18) and (19) can then be made 
operational by studying 
.HgI (gj) = {P - C(gi, q)(P, q) B(gj) 
This set, Hgl (gj), is the set of profit numbers that would be generated if grade i 
units had been sold at the prices and qualities at which grade j units were actually 
traded. If i =j, it is the set of actual profits that occurred. If i ?j, it is a type of 
opportunity cost that holders of grade i experienced because they did not sell 
their units in the (price, quality) range in which the other grade was trading. The 
strategy for using these distributions will be to let a quantity, say, Ps - C(R, qs), 
used in the profit equations be equal to the mean of HR(S). So the mean of 
HR(S) is the opportunity cost of selling an R as if it were an S. The mean values 
of Hg, (gj) are in Table III. These will be discussed later. 
The strategy for reporting the results is dictated by the results themselves. A 
tree that can be used as a guide through the arguments is found in the concluding 
section. The first conclusion differentiates ideas about pooling from other ideas. 
Pooling, it seems, occurs in early periods of many markets but it occurs later, 
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after a few initial periods of adjustment, only in the experiments in which the 
costs of signaling supers is high ($.07 as opposed to $.02). The discussion of 
pooling is then postponed until a later section which focuses on those experiments 
alone. The second set of conclusions is developed for markets in which signaling 
equllibrium models might apply. These are all the markets with low signaling 
costs. The conclusions indicate that signaling existed in a substantial proportion 
of the markets. The analysis then proceeds to differentiate those markets which 
might be near equilibrium and attempts to ascertain which of the equilibrium 
models is the most appropriate. The final parts of this section return to the 
question of pooling and then go on to cover some miscellaneous issues regarding 
these markets. 
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TABLE 
III 
MEAN 
VALUES 
OF 
Hg,(gj), 
ALL 
PERIODS, 
ALL 
EXPERIMENTSa 
Experiment 
2 
Experiment 
3 
Experiment 
4 
Experiment 
5 
Period 
RR 
RS 
SS 
SR 
RR 
RS 
SS 
SR 
RR 
RS 
SS 
SR 
RR 
RS 
SS 
SR 
1 
0.65* 
-3.56 
2.94* 
1.69 
0.29* 
-4.33 
1.95 
1.66 
0.67* 
0.03 
1.23 
1.20 
0.70 
-2.67 
0.51 
1.50 
2 
0.62 
-6.79 
2.96* 
1.53 
0.5 * 
-5.82 
1.37 
1.97 
0.52 
0.44 
1.36 
1.16 
0.64 
0.39 
1.28 
1.52 
3 
0.52* 
-3.54 
3.50* 
1.38 
0.44 
-2.78 
1.68 
1.65 
0.68* 
0.15 
1.28 
1.2  
0.63 
0.22 
1.34 
1.09 
4 
0.61* 
-4.05 
3.5 * 
1.37 
0.53 
-1.31 
1.7  
1.49 
0.58 
0.37 
1.30* 
1.12 
0.93* 
0.5  
1.62 
1.33 
5 
0.6 * 
-2.82 
3.67* 
1.42 
0.31* 
-3.69 
2.0  
2.00 
0.61* 
0.33 
1.47* 
1.10 
0.92 
0.38 
1.60 
1.64 
6 
0.81* 
-1.38 
3.82* 
2.15 
0.53* 
-1.47 
2.21* 
1.63 
0.61* 
1.34 
1.42 
1.27 
0.99 
0.51 
1.63 
1.38 
7 
0.6 * 
-1.64 
3.77* 
1.34 
0.43* 
-5.52 
2.7 * 
1.82 
0.75* 
0.46 
1.46* 
1.13 
0.91 
0.49 
1.68 
1.68 
8 
0.53* 
-0.26 
3.97* 
1.74 
0.73* 
-2.63 
2.26 
1.99 
0.81 
0.59 
1.59* 
1.29 
1.25 
1.19 
1.59 
1.65 
9 
0.53 
-0.04 
4.0 * 
1.43 
1.22* 
-6.89 
2.10 
1.76 
0.83* 
0.47 
1.59 
1.33 
1.42 
1.28 
2.14 
2.1  
10 
0.59* 
0.13 
4.03* 
1.33 
0.88 
-5.39 
2.08 
2.09 
0.88* 
0.49 
1.68* 
1.38 
1.37 
0.35 
1.60 
1.77 
11 
1.02* 
-3.5  
1.87 
1.91 
1.02* 
0.8  
1.93* 
1.39 
1.50 
1.11 
1.92 
2.22 
12 
0.98 
0.89 
2.09* 
1.76 
1.46 
1.71 
2.5  
2.15 
13 
1.19 
1.08 
2.34 
2.19 
1.76 
1.63 
2.3  
2.60 
14 
1.37 
1.24 
2.51 
2.23 
15 
1.64 
1.37 
2.71* 
2.31 
16 
1.58 
1.56 
2.8 * 
2.18 
17 
1.75 
1.72 
3.0 * 
2.58 
18 
1.83 
1.62 
3.03 
2.8  
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TABLE 
III-(cont.) 
Experiment 
6 
Experiment 
7 
Experiment 
8 
Experiment 
9 
Period 
RR 
RS 
SS 
SR 
RR 
RS 
SS 
SR 
RR 
RS 
SS 
SR 
RR 
RS 
SS 
SR 
1 
0.33* 
-6.22 
1.58 
1.08 
1.97* 
-5.14 
2.92 
3.27 
0.30 
-2.70 
1.81 
1.99 
0.69* 
-3.69 
3.35 
3.18 
2 
0.52* 
-5.02 
2.02 
1.74 
1.97* 
-2.17 
3.46 
3.05 
0.66* 
-2.9  
2.15 
1.93 
1.00 
-0.12 
3.49 
3.47 
3 
0.62* 
-5.72 
2.14 
1.92 
2.10* 
-2.9  
3.57 
2.97 
0.75* 
-1.21 
2.26 
2.2  
1.52 
0.10 
3.48 
3.47 
4 
0.53* 
-1.24 
2.14* 
1.82 
2.0 * 
-8.89 
4.11* 
3.10 
0.69* 
-1.42 
1.93* 
1.54 
1.8  
0.4  
3.22* 
2.85 
5 
0.54* 
-4.19 
2.09* 
1.45 
2.01* 
-8.16 
4.8 * 
3.31 
0.57 
-0.62 
2.23* 
1.03 
1.68* 
-0.17 
3.40* 
2.66 
6 
0.62* 
-5.42 
2.17* 
1.6  
2.08* 
-8.12 
4.88* 
3.07 
0.63* 
-0.26 
2.17* 
1.27 
1.72* 
-0.63 
3.70* 
3.0  
7 
0.59* 
-3.81 
2.26* 
1.26 
2.08* 
-8.25 
4.75* 
2.95 
0.75* 
-2.47 
2.19* 
1.38 
1.89* 
0.21 
3.57 
3.04 
8 
0.64* 
-7.47 
2.27* 
1.18 
2.07* 
-5.72 
3.82* 
3.11 
0.74* 
-1.9  
2.24* 
1.4  
1.76* 
0.03 
3.72* 
2.71 
9 
0.64* 
-7.22 
2.3 * 
1.3  
2.11* 
-3.01 
3.92* 
2.76 
0.83* 
-0.29 
2.61* 
1.47 
1.59* 
-1.32 
3.55* 
2.74 
10 
0.6 * 
-5.50 
2.30* 
1.25 
2.1 * 
-3.67 
4.1 * 
2.99 
1.96* 
0.02 
3.70* 
2.69 
11 
0.69* 
-7.8  
2.33* 
1.4  
2.05* 
-7.41 
3.86* 
2.96 
12 
2.14* 
-7.80 
4.12* 
2.9  
13 
2.11* 
-8.5  
4.21* 
2.97 
14 
2.10* 
-8.46 
4.5 * 
2.98 
15 
2.1 * 
-8.22 
4.57* 
2.90 
16 
2.1 * 
-8.01 
4.78* 
2.90 
17 
2.07* 
-7.92 
4.87* 
3.11 
18 
2.10* 
-7.39 
4.96* 
2.88 
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TABLE 
III-(cont.) 
Experiment 
10 
Experiment 
I I 
Experiment 
12 
(gls 
gJ) 
(g,X 
gJ) 
(g,s 
FJ) 
Period 
RR 
RS 
SS 
SR 
RR 
RS 
SS 
SR 
RR 
RS 
SS 
SR 
1 
1.48 
0.93 
2.59 
2.58 
1.38* 
-0.58 
2.67 
2.47 
0.40 
0.72 
2.85 
1.84 
2 
1.55* 
0.3  
3.22* 
2.59 
1.97* 
0.29 
3.2  
3.01 
0.75 
1.5  
3.10* 
1.39 
3 
1.55 
-0.91 
3.32* 
2.20 
1.96* 
-3.87 
4.36* 
3.58 
0.71 
0.39 
2.66* 
1.35 
4 
1.45 
-0.54 
3.36 
2.94 
2.08* 
-3.25 
4.98* 
3.60 
0.78 
0.51 
2.64 
1.75 
5 
1.89 
-0.3  
3.14 
2.93 
2.2 * 
1.07 
5.40* 
2.87 
1.3  
0.24 
2.54 
2.77 
6 
1.69* 
-1.29 
3.36 
2.69 
2.26* 
-0.01 
5.41* 
3.7  
0.8  
0.59 
2.66 
2.03 
7 
1.64* 
-1.37 
3.50* 
2.29 
2.15 
2.01 
5.58 
4.64 
0.73 
0.52 
2.72* 
1.4  
8 
1.96* 
-3.00 
3.50* 
3.13 
2.23 
0.83 
5.49* 
3.40 
0.76 
0.65 
2.7 * 
1.8  
9 
1.68* 
-2.95 
3.55 
2.72 
2.12 
1.66 
5.56* 
3.77 
0.68 
1.05 
2.9 * 
1.62 
10 
1.42* 
-2.81 
3.69* 
2.07 
2.23* 
0.73 
5.50* 
2.88 
0.83 
0.43 
2.63 
2.13 
11 
1.75* 
-2.37 
3.59* 
2.53 
2.19* 
1.05 
5.49* 
2.88 
0.65 
0.54 
2.67* 
1.38 
12 
1.50* 
-1.1  
3.75* 
2.34 
2.14* 
0.87 
5.52* 
2.90 
0.79 
0.45 
2.65* 
1.53 
13 
1.75 
-0.16 
3.90* 
2.9  
0.68 
0.48 
2.67* 
1.68 
14 
1.25 
-0.02 
4.04* 
2.07 
15 
1.43* 
-1.0  
3.88* 
2.41 
a7ng,(gJ) 
is 
the 
set 
of 
profit 
numbers 
that 
would 
be 
generated 
if 
grade 
i 
units 
had 
been 
sold 
at 
the 
prices 
and 
qualities 
at 
which 
grade j 
units 
were 
actually 
sold. 
For 
example, 
mean 
HR(S) 
is 
the 
"opportunity 
cost" 
of 
not 
having 
sold 
regulars 
as 
supers 
and 
is 
found 
under 
column 
RS. 
* 
denotes 
a 
two-tailed 
t 
test 
that 
Hg,(g,) 
? 
He 
(ga) 
is 
significant 
at 
.05 
or 
better. 
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A. Pooling vs. Nonpooling 
The first question pits the pooling equilibrium model against all other equilibria. 
In the pooling model qR = qs for all values of parameters studied here. In the 
equilibria predicted by nonpooling models qR < qs. Thus, an appropriate test of 
pooling against nonpooling is equality of quality levels of regulars and supers. 
The result, as summarized in the conclusion, is that pooling does not occur in 
markets in which signaling costs are low. When signaling costs are high a pooling 
hypothesis frequently cannot be rejected. However, the conclusion is sensitive 
to the test, as is discussed below. 
CONCLUSION 1: Quality separation occurs in all markets in which the marginal 
cost of signaling a super is relatively low (i.e. experiments 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11). 
These markets are not pooled. 
Two important definitions are required in order to make this conclusion 
operational. The first is the test for separation in qualities and the second is the 
periods to which the test is to be applied. Two tests are used. The first is a range 
test. Does the range of qualities of grade super overlap the range of qualities for 
grade regular? If the answer is "no" then the grades are said to be separated. 
The second test of separation is a t test of the difference between mean quality 
of supers and mean quality of regulars based on an (obviously incorrect) assump- 
tion about normality of the distribution of qualities of each grade.9 
Four of the last five periods of experiments (2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11) are separated 
according to both criteria. Because there is no ambiguity in either test, we think 
one can safely claim the markets have separated and are not pooled during the 
last part of the experiments at least. 
CONCLUSION 2: Quality separation occurs infrequently or ambiguously in 
markets in which the signaling costs are relatively high (i.e. experiments 4, 5, 
12). These markets are candidates for pooling equilibrium models. 
In experiments 4, 5, and 12 the quality ranges of regulars and supers overlap 
almost every period. For example, overlap exists in the last five periods of all 
three markets. In experiment 5 the hypothesis that the mean quality of supers 
equals the mean quality of regulars can be rejected in only one of the last seven 
periods. In experiments 4 and 12 the hypothesis of equality of quality means can 
be rejected in three of the last six periods for experiment 4 and in six of the last 
seven periods of experiment 12. With such ambiguity one cannot say that the 
markets are separated, nor can one say with confidence that they are pooled. 
Nevertheless, we will analyze these two experiments along with experiment 5 as 
those which might be pooled. 
9 In addition, equality of sample variances is assumed in order to sidestep the Fisher-Behrens 
problem. The results do not appear to change significantly if the degrees of freedom are adjusted to 
take into account possible differences in these variances. 
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Another criterion of pooling involves the profit equations (9) and (13). The 
equations imply an equality between actual profits and opportunity costs (poten- 
tial profits). An examination of this relationship is reserved for later. 
B. Signaling vs. Nonsignaling 
The analysis now turns to those markets in which qualities are separated (2, 
3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 1 1) and in which signaling equilibrium models might be successfully 
applied. The signaling models and the naive model all predict quality separation, 
but the implication of such separation differs among the models in the sense that 
signaling models suggest that the quality will be used as a signal for the underlying 
grade, and thus the quality has implications for price beyond the intrinsic value 
of the quality. 
The appropriate tool for differentiating the two classes of ideas is the excess 
value measure. If regulars and supers are being sold at different levels, of quality, 
and if the quality is used as a signal, then excess value, x(q), should be positively 
related to quality. Units with high quality will be recognized as supers and the 
price will be bid upward relative to the value of a regular at that level of quality. 
The conclusion is that signaling occurs in all of the "nonpooled" markets except 
two. 
CONCLUSION 3: Markets with separated qualities were checked for signaling. 
Signaling as measured by excess value exists in markets 2, 6, 7, 9, 10, and 11. 
Signaling does not occur in experiments 3 and 8. 
The conclusion is made operational by a difference in means test. The hypothesis 
that 
-I x(q) - -x(q) > 0 
ISjs IRjR 
was tested for the last periods of experiments 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11. In 
experiments 2, 6, 7, 10, and 11 the difference is significantly (.05 or better) positive 
in all of the last five periods and in all periods after the tenth in each of these 
experiments which had that many periods. On the other hand, in experiments 3 
and 8 the difference is significant at .10 in no more than three periods over all 
periods of each and significant separation at the .05 level occurs only once in 
each. Thus experiments 2, 6, 7, 10, and 11 appear to be separated while 3 and 8 
are not separated. The borderline case is experiment 9, in which only three of 
the last five periods are separated at the .05 level or better. We chose to analyze 
it as having been separated. 
The result establishes that, empirically, quality separation of grades is not a 
sufficient condition for the presence of signaling. The natural question is whether 
one of the other models fits the data. The only remaining model is the naive 
model, since both pooling and all classes of signaling models, including the 
perfect information model, can be rejected as capturing the essence of markets 
3 and 8. 
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CONCLUSION 4. The behavior of experiments 3 and 8, the only markets in which 
the naive model might be successfully applied, are difficult to reconcile with the 
naive model. 
The naive model predicts that the excess value of both supers and regulars 
should equal $1.00. In both cases the excess value is closer to 0. Risk aversion 
is consistent with the low price of supers but risk aversion does not account for 
the high quality level of the supers. The naive model predicts supers at 18 or 19 
while the actual qualities are on the order of 30 or more. Thus, the behavior of 
both of these markets remains a matter of speculation. 
C. Equilibrium vs. Disequilibrium in Signaling Markets 
Experimental markets adjust over time through some yet-to-be-modeled 
dynamic process. There is also no generally accepted convention for defining 
when a market is in equilibrium. These facts create difficulties for those who wish 
to study and apply competing equilibrium models. The proper equilibrium model 
might be rejected from a competing set of models because the models were 
applied while the markets were still undergoing substantial adjustment. 
Fortunately all signaling models agree on two dimensions of equilibrium 
behavior. The excess value of supers should be near $2.00 and the excess value 
of regulars should be slightly below zero. The strategy of model evaulation is to 
first identify those markets that are close to equilibrium on this criterion and 
define them as being in equilibrium. In the next section we will then check the 
quality levels in the equilibrated markets so defined, to evaluate the competing 
signaling models. All of the signaling models make different predictions about 
quality. 
CONCLUSION 5: Markets 2, 7, and 11 are statistically (.05 level of significance) 
within $.05 of the predicted equilibria in the last two periods or more. On this 
criterion they have equilibrated. Markets 6, 9, and 10 have not equilibrated. 
In the last two periods of experiments 2, 7, and l Ithe compound hypothesis 
that the excess values of regulars and supers are drawn from distributions with 
means within $.05 of 0 and $2.00 respectively cannot be rejected at the .05 level 
of significance. If an assumption is accepted that transaction costs are about .05 
then the predictions of the model are expanded to the supported range. Use of 
$.05 as a transaction cost is not without precedent. Commissions which are 
normally used to pull the data to exact equilibria are absent in these markets. 
Of course, one would like a better convention but currently such adjustments to 
models are all that exist. In experiments 6, 9, and 10 the prices of supers are 
never close to the equilibrium predictions in a statistical sense. 
The visual impression one gets from the time series is that markets 6 and 10 
are both converging to some signaling equilibrium. The qualities are well separated 
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and the excess values are moving toward the equilibrium values as the periods 
replicate. The qualitative aspects of experiment 9 are similar except prices are 
very low. Market 9 had only two buyers but duopolies are generally unsuc- 
cessful in keeping prices far away from competitive levels in experimental 
markets. 
D. Competing Signaling Models 
Three of the markets appear to be in some sort of signaling equilibrium. The 
markets are 2, 7, and 11. The question is now which of the three signaling models 
is most appropriate. 
CONCLUSION 6: In markets 2, 7, and 11, both the perfect information model 
and the efficient signaling equilibrium model can be rejected in favor of the 
inefficient signaling equilibrium model. 
The perfect information model predicts the quality of supers will be eighteen 
or nineteen units. The efficient signaling equilibirum predicts supers at twenty- 
seven units while the inefficient signaling equilibrium model predicts super quality 
at above twenty-seven units. In all three markets and in all of the last few periods 
the hypothesis that super quality is 4wenty-seven units or less can be rejected at 
.05 level of significance. The regulars are near the five to six quality unit level as 
predicted by all models. 
The profit and opportunity cost calculations in Table III support this con- 
clusion. The equality demanded in equation (18) can be rejected (at .1 level) in 
all periods in all of these experiments except periods 7 and 9 of experiment 11. 
A difference in means tests for the quality of appropriate values of the means in 
Table III as dictated by (18) can be rejected. The t statistics for differences are 
in Table III. 
The direction of movement in both experiments 2 and 11 is of interest and 
perhaps some importance. Notice that the movement of quality levels is toward 
the most efficient signaling equilibrium. Relative to the distance traveled by the 
qualities the levels are very close to the signaling equilibrium. 
CONJECTURE 1: Both experiments 2 and 11 are converging to the most efficient 
signaling equilibrium. 
In some respects one should conjecture that these experiments are at a most 
efficient signaling equilibrium. The quality levels are within $.03 in surplus terms 
of the most efficient signaling equilibrium. The variance in qualities is low and 
is actually zero for grades in some periods. Given that information can only be 
gathered through bids to make risky purchases this might be as close to the 
efficient signaling equilibrium as can be reasonably expected. 
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E. Pooling, Partial Pooling, and "Near" Nonexistence 
The discussion now turns to markets 4, 5, and 12. These are the markets with 
high signaling cost. None of these three markets have separated grades'0 so some 
notion of pooling is called for as an explanation. The competing a priori explana- 
tions are the pooling equilibrium, the partial pooling equilibrium, and the near 
nonexistence of a Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium." Summarizing the analysis 
below, experiment 5 is a candidate for the pooling model and experiment 4 is a 
candidate for partial pooling. Experiment 12 seems to involve a substantially 
different phenomenon discussed in the next section. As it turns out none of these 
models provide a completely convincing explanation of what happened in the 
markets. 
CONCLUSION 7: Experiment 5 is a good candidate for the pooling equilibrium 
model. 
Price behavior is the major datum that goes against this conclusion. The pooling 
model predicts a single quality, q*, and price behavior such that x(q*) = 1 or 
perhaps below $1 because of risk aversion. Contrary to this prediction average 
excess value is above $1 in the last two periods. We are at a loss for an 
explanation.'2 The other predictions of the pooling model seem to be supported. 
The existence of a single quality, q*, predicted by the model is supported by the 
facts that equality of mean quality of regulars and supers cannot be rejected 
(even at the .2 level) in five of the last six periods; the variance of qualities tend 
to decrease to within 20 per cent of the mean;13 and the quality level is near the 
most efficient pooling quality of ten units. The mean excess values of supers and 
regulars is never significantly different which suggests the lack of quality signals. 
The profit equations of the pooling model, (9) and (10), cannot be rejected (Table 
III). On all dimensions but one the pooling model is supported. 
For the next two experiments (4 and 12) both partial pooling and "disequili- 
brium" concepts are of interest. Partial pooling models drop the assumption of 
the pooling model that only one quality exists and replace it with an assumption 
of two qualities (qR and qM with qR < qM). At the lower quality only regulars 
are traded, and the other quality involves a mix of grades with all supers trading 
at the higher quality and some number, a, of the regulars trading there as well. 
The full model is described by equations (11) through (14) and perhaps (15) as 
well. 
CONCLUSION 8: Experiments 4 and 12 have elements of partial pooling equili- 
brium behavior. The pooling equilibrium model can be rejected for both. However, 
10 A weaker test of separation than was applied above, such as a positive correlation between 
grade and quality, would almost certainly have these markets separated. 
I See footnote 8. 
12 We suspect that the bonus paid to the buyers for making at least one purchase plays a role. 
13 The variance in experiments 2, 6, 9, 10, 11 tends to be many times this level. 
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both experiments exhibit prominent behaviors contrary to the partial pooling 
models. 
The pooling equilibrium model can be rejected in favor of partial pooling on 
four grounds. In both experiment 4 and experiment 12 the excess values of 
regulars are separated from the excess values of supers. Pooling requires equality 
of excess values whereas partial pooling allows inequality. (The t on mean 
difference is significant at .01 for three of the last four periods.) Second, the 
excess value of supers in both experiments is considerably above the $1.00 
predicted by the pooling model. Third, an argument can be made that two quality 
levels, qR and qM exist rather than a single quality level. The later periods of both 
experiments have the low end range of the regulars anchored in the sense that 
some regulars and only regulars were sold at these low levels. In addition the 
quality of supers is bounded from below at 15 for experiment 4 and 20 for 
experiment 12 in the last several periods. Thus in both markets there is a quality 
below which sales of supers never occurs but sales of regulars do occur there so 
in both experiments there is a specific quality range in which a regular will be 
acquired with certainty. 
Fourth, the profit data favor partial pooling over pooling. Both the pooling 
and partial pooling models have equation (13) in common. The data from Table 
III suggest that the equation is satisfied in both experiments 4 and 12. This 
condition that sellers of regulars be indifferent between the terms of regular sales 
and the terms of super sales can never be rejected in experiment 12 and it cannot 
be rejected in any of the last seven periods of experiment 4. The pooling model 
through equation (10) requires that sellers of supers should also be indifferent 
between the terms of regulars and the terms of supers but the partial pooling 
model, through inequality (14), allows supers to prefer the high quality ranges. 
In both experiments 4 and 12 the equality of profits demanded by the pooling 
model is rejected in favor of the inequality of partial pooling. In five of the last 
seven periods of experiment 4 and in six of the last seven periods of experiment 
12 equality can be rejected in favor of the appropriate inequality. Sellers of supers 
have no incentive to pose as regulars. 
The partial pooling model has some substantial inconsistencies with the data. 
Table IV gives the average excess value of the lowest quality units for the last 
several periods of experiments 4, 5, and 12. Since these qualities were always 
regulars the excess values should converge to slightly below zero as is dictated 
by equation (1 1). As can be seen, experiment 12 has this property. In experiments 
4 and 5 the movement is in the wrong direction so the partial pooling model can 
be rejected for both. We have no explanation of this phenomenon other than a 
possible relationship with the bonuses as was mentioned above in connection 
with the discussion of experiment 5. 
In experiment 12 the prices of supers are "too high" to be consistent with 
partial pooling. Excess values of supers are near the range of $1.90 to $1.95, 
which is about as close to competitive equilibrium fully informed levels as might 
be expected with transaction costs. In addition, in experiment 12 the profits of 
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TABLE IV 
AVERAGE EXCESS VALUE OF UNITS TRADING AT THE LOWEST BOUND OF QUALITY 
RANGES 
(only Regulars trade at these qualities) 
Period 
Experiment 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
4 .19 .28 .51 .61 .70 .60 1.39 1.00 1.29 1.50 
5 .31 .78 .60 .48 1.20 
12 -.04 -.05 -.04 -.05 -.05 
regulars selling at the various quality levels are not equal in a manner that is 
hidden by a simple comparison of mean profit levels. Some regulars do sell in 
the super ranges and are much more profitable than regulars selling in the lower 
(regular) ranges of qualities. Furthermore the supers sell in two ranges of qualities 
rather than the one predicted by partial pooling. In summary, several aspects of 
the data do not support partial pooling as a general explanation for the experience 
of experiment 12 even though the partial pooling model is more accurate than 
the pooling method. 
In summary, the best model is partial pooling. A tempting explanation is that 
the Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibria do not exist as a practical matter and that the 
"disequilibrium" behavior we are observing represents a rejection of the most 
efficient signaling equilibrium model as capturing the proper equilibrium principle 
in favor of the Rothschild-Stiglitz concept. Two ad hoc explanations compete 
with that explanation. First, the high prices in experiment 4 suggest unwarranted 
buyer optimism. If such optimism actually exists, the remainder of the market 
behavior in experiment 4 can be understood without resort to the Rothschild- 
Stiglitz equilibrium concept. The behavior of the other perplexing experiment, 
12, can be understood in terms of special signals as discussed in the next section. 
Finally, this "near nonexistence" explanation has difficulty with the fact that the 
pooling model works so well in experiment 5. 
F. Special Sources of Signals 
Quality is not the only source of signals in a market. Any face-to-face market 
is rich with possibilities including the tone-of-voice bids or the speed of bids. 
Such an environment also allows for the possible development of reputations. 
Two instances in these experiments support the following conjecture. 
CONJECTURE 2: The applicability of signaling equilibrium models is sensitive 
to the market institutional environment. The institutional environment affects 
both the publicness of the signal and the nature of the signal. 
Support for the first part of the conjecture is found in experiment 7 and in the 
difference between experiment 8 on one hand and 4 and 5 on the other. The key 
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variable here is the experimental procedure of circling of regular contracts and 
super contracts with different colored chalk after the period was over and the 
grades were announced. The use of the chalk focused buyers on the possibility 
that the level of quality actually contained information. We suspect that many 
agents in experiments without the use of colored chalk never recognized or even 
suspected a positive relationship existed between quality and grade. Even though 
the information was in front of them they never looked. We suspect that the fall 
in excess value in experiment 7, beginning with period 8, reflects in part a lack 
of awareness on the part of a few buyers and a lack of confidence on the part 
of others that the quality and grade were related. The increase in excess value 
of supers after period 11 in experiment 7 is, we feel, due to the use of colored 
chalk and the information it provided. 
We suspect that some sort of public recognition of a signal helps instigate the 
development of signaling equilibria. We also suspect that experience in the market 
is also important to this end. 
The second instance occurs in experiment 12, in which special signals seem to 
have developed and generated a different type of equilibrium that reflects a 
combination of signaling and reputation development. Sellers of supers can make 
profitable trades that are unprofitable to sellers of regulars. The market institution, 
which included the possibility of making offers that were not accepted, could 
thus be used by sellers of supers to make offers that were unprofitable for regulars. 
Offers of quality 100 at the franc equivalent of $10, for example, began to appear 
early in experiment 12. These offers were never accepted but the fact that they 
were made suggested that the seller was a super and since seller identifications 
were known a reputation could form.'4 The market seemed to be adjusting along 
these lines with those who made offers of 100 at $10 having established a reputation 
as selling a super. Then the regulars began making such offers also. Even though 
regulars would lose considerable money if such an offer was accepted, such 
transactions never took place because the buyers would have also lost money. 
Thus a signal developed which established a reputation, seemed to affect prices 
and qualities, and then eroded as regulars with some perceived risk made the 
same offers. 
Sellers in later periods of experiment 12 began developing a different strategy 
for reputation formation. By selling their first unit at a price and quality that was 
clearly reserved for supers their identity as supers became known and their second 
unit could be sold as if with perfect information in a range that would have been 
profitable for regulars. This hypothesis explains why, in experiment 12, the profits 
from regulars differed between the low qualities, as opposed to the price and 
qualities where supers tended to trade. The identity of the latter as supers was 
known to buyers who would thus pay high prices. In the last four periods of 
experiment 12 the first unit of all super sellers was sold (usually as a result of a 
bid) at a quality of approximately 30 and a price of about $4.50, which was 
14 Subsequent developments in experimental technology now allow trades without traders knowing 
the identification of the trading partners. 
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TABLE V 
[SALES/ATTEMPTED] SALES AS RELATED TO SELLER REPUTATION 
FINAL PERIODS OF EXPERIMENT 12 
Sellers of Regulars Sellers of Supers All Sellers 
Reputation? Reputation? Reputation? 
Period Y N Y N Y N 
10 1/1 1/2 1/2 1/2 2/3 2/4 
11 0/0 0/3 3/3 0/3 3/3 0/6 
12 0/1 1/2 3/3 0/3 3/4 1/5 
13 0/1 1/1 3/3 0/2 3/4 1/3 
NOTES: Y: seller had made a sale at a quality of 30 or more; N: seller had not made a sale at a 
quality of 30 or more. Numerator: number of offers counted in the denominator that were actually 
accepted; Denominator: number of offers made at quality 20 by sellers with the indicated grade and 
reputation. 
unprofitable for regulars. Regulars never sold on these terms. The second unit 
was then offered at a quality of 20 at $4.50. Notice the second action was an 
offer rather than a bid because a bid could be accepted by any seller. Offers by 
other sellers (regulars) existed at (20, $4.50) but were substantially passed over 
by buyers. Offers by sellers who had sold at (30, $4.50) were taken immediately. 
The prices at both qualities were near the competitive equilibrium. The variance 
in quality of regulars in the later periods of the experiment and the high average 
quality of regulars is due to an occasional "foolish" purchase by a buyer who 
bought at (20, $4.50) from a seller who had not produced the above signal. 
The data in Table V make the point. If sellers have established a reputation 
by making a sale at a quality above 30, they have a greater probability of having 
their offers accepted at a quality of 20 than do sellers who have not established 
such a reputation. The probability of a sale at quality 20, given an attempted 
sale, is near 1 for those with an established reputation, but it is only near 4 for 
those without (using the frequencies from the last four periods). 
CONJECTURE 3: Seller reputations developed in experiment 12. 
G. Dynamics 
Those markets that seem to equilibrate all have a similar dynamic pattern. The 
quality of supers initially separates very high above the most efficient level of 
signaling. The "noise" is thus eliminated. This is followed by a reduction in 
quality of regulars, an increase in excess values of supers and a reduction in 
excess values of regulars. The time structure of the latter adjustments is unclear. 
The quality of supers then begins to adjust downward, increasing the overall 
market efficiency. 
CONJECTURE 4: The dynamics of the signaling equilibrium is for the equili- 
brium level of the signaling quality to be approached from above. 
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This conjecture might contain the seeds of an explanation of the failure of the 
high signaling cost markets to converge to a signaling equilibrium. With low 
signaling costs the range of qualities which necessarily separate the grades and 
are feasible from an exchange point of view is larger for the low signaling cost 
markets. Only the low cost markets might have converged to a separating equili- 
brium because it was easier for the necessary dynamic process to be initiated. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The tree (Figure 7) gives the structure of the paper and empirical results for 
all experiments, as we think the weight of evidence and conjectures support. One 
striking thing about the results of these experiments is the substantial differences 
in behavior across all experiments. Even though care was exercised to keep 
conditions the same across experiments no single model accounts for the behavior 
of all markets. 
The method of analyzing the data seems a bit unorthodox. The use of a sequence 
of criteria to determine the data to which various models will be applied raises 
an obvious question. What would happen if the criteria were applied in a different 
order? Given our operational definitions of separation, equilibrium, and the like, 
the results would all remain as given. All experiments would end up in the same 
groups. Operational definitions exist, however, for which the final groupings 
would change with the ordering of application of the criteria. We can only call 
this problem to the attention of the reader and leave open the basic methodological 
question of what is the best way to proceed. 
The major conclusion is that signaling is a real phenomenon (Conclusion 3); a 
notion of equilibrium is appropriate (Conclusion 5); and that the most efficient 
signaling equilibrium can reasonably be expected to emerge (Conjecture 1). The 
second major conclusion is that quality separation of grades is not a sufficient 
condition for having observed a signaling equilibrium (Conclusion 3). Third, 
aspects of pooling can be observed (Conclusion 7) but it is unclear whether or 
not this pooling behavior involves the type of cycling suggested by the non- 
existence of a Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium (Conclusion 8). The data lead to 
some interesting speculations. Signaling equilibrium seems to be established 
through a special type of dynamics (Conjecture 4); an interaction appears to 
exist between signals and reputation formation (Conjecture 3); and the signaling 
phenomenon itself seems to be sensitive to market organization and the institu- 
tional features of markets (Conjecture 2). Thus theoretical work along the line 
of these speculations might be productive and investigations of the signaling 
implications of institutions should be checked when evaluated in the context of 
policy research. 
Boston University 
and 
California Institute of Technology 
Manuscript received October, 1982; final revision received August, 1984. 
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APPENDIX: INSTRUCTIONS 
General 
This is an experiment in the economics of market decision making. Various research foundations 
have provided funds for this research. The instructions are simple and if you follow them carefully 
and make good decisions you might earn a considerable amount of money, which will be paid to 
you in cash at the end of the experiment. 
In this experiment we are going to conduct a market in which some of you will be buyers and 
some of you will be sellers in a sequence of market days or trading periods. Attached to the instructions 
you will find some sheets, labeled Buyer or Seller, which describe the value to you of any decisions 
you might make. You are not to reveal this information to anyone. It is your own private information. 
The type of currency used in this market is francs. All trading and earnings will be in terms of 
francs. Each franc is worth dollars to you. Do not reveal this number to anyone. At the end of 
the experiment your francs will be converted to dollars at this rate, and you will be paid in dollars. 
Notice that the more francs you earn, the more dollars you earn. 
Specific Instructions to Buyers 
During each market period you are free to purchase from any seller or sellers as many units as 
you might want. The value of a unit depends upon its type and its quality. There are two types (Super 
and Regular) and the value of a Super for any given quality is much greater than the value of a 
Regular. At the time you buy a unit you will not know the type but you will know the quality. At 
the end of a trading period you will be told the type of each unit you bought. 
The redemption value of a unit is obtained by adding its base value to its quality value. The quality 
value for each quality level appears in Table IA. So the value of quality is the same for both types 
but the base value differs. 
Your payoffs are computed as follows: You will receive the difference between the redemption 
value of the units and the total amount you paid for the purchases. Also, you will receive a bonus 
for each period in which you purchase a unit. 
Suppose, for example, that you buy one unit with a quality level of 1000 at a price of 1000. Assume 
that according to Table IA the quality value for a quality level of 1000 is 1500. Assume further that 
the base value of a Super is 1250 and a Regular is 200. If at the end of the period you are told that 
your unit was a Super, ,your earnings would then be: 
earnings = 1500+ 1250 - 1000 = 1750. 
Or, if you are told it is a Regular your earnings would be: 
earnings = 1500 + 200 - 1000 = 700. 
In addition, you would collect the bonus for purchasing at least one unit that trading period. 
At the time you make the purchase you should enter the quality value in row 2 of your buyer sheet 
and the price you paid for the unit in row 4. At the end of the period when you are told what type 
of units you have bought, you should enter the base value of these units in row 1. You can then 
calculate the total redemption value (row 1 + row 2) and enter this value in row 3. The profit for each 
unit is then row 3 - row 4 and this number is entered in row 5. The first unit you purchase in a trading 
period should be entered in the first column of your buyer sheet for that period, the second unit 
should be entered in the second column, and so on. If you make any purchases in a trading period, 
you also collect the bonus which appears in the last column. After you have calculated the profit (or 
loss) for each unit, record the total earnings in the blank at the bottom of your buyer sheet. When 
the period ends remove this sheet to reveal the buyer sheet for the next period. 
Your total payoffs will be accumulated over several trading periods and the total amount will be 
paid to you after the experiment. 
Specific Instructions to Sellers 
During each market period you are free to sell to any buyer or buyers up to a total of - units. 
You are free to choose the quality level of all units you sell, but quality is added at a cost to you. 
The type of unit you will sell during a market period is given at the top of the seller sheet for that 
period. If the unit you are selling is a Super, the cost for each additional level of quality will be 
If the unit you are selling is a Regular, the cost for each additional level of quality will be . As 
you can see it is much easier to supply quality if you are selling a Super than it is if you are selling 
a Regular. 
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The cost of the first unit you sell during a trading period should be entered in row 2 of your seller 
sheet at the time of the sale. The table labeled Super gives the cost when you are selling a Super 
unit, and the table labeled Regular gives the cost when you are selling a Regular unit. If you sell a 
second unit, the cost of this unit should also be found in the appropriate table and entered in row 
5 of your seller sheet. Under no conditions may you sell a unit at a price below the cost of the unit. For 
each unit sold your earnings (profits) are calculated as follows: 
[your earnings = (sale price of unit) - (cost of the unit)]. 
Suppose, for example, that you sell the first unit at 2000 with a quality of 1400 and the second 
unit at 1900 with a quality of 1000. Suppose further that at a quality of 1400 your cost is 1000 and 
at a quality of 1000 your cost is 500. Then, your earnings are: 
earnings from 1 st = 2000 - 1000 = 1000, 
earnings from 2nd = 1900 - 500 = 1400, 
total earnings = 1000 + 1400 = 2400. 
The blanks on your seller sheet will help you record your profits. The sale price of the first unit 
you sell during the 1st period should be recorded on row (1) at the time of sale. Also, the quality 
level and the cost of the unit should be entered in row (2). You should then record the profits on 
this sale as directed in row (3). At the end of the period record the total profit on the last row on 
the page. Subsequent periods should be recorded similarly. 
Your total profits for a trading period, which are yours to keep, are computed by adding up the 
profits on sales made during the trading period. 
At the end of each period remove the seller sheet for that period to reveal the seller sheet for the 
next period. Do not look at any seller sheet until its period is announced. 
Market Organization 
The market for this commodity is organized as follows. The market will be conducted in a series 
of trading periods. Each period lasts for at most - minutes. Any buyer is free at any time during 
the period to make a verbal bid to buy the commodity at a specificed price and at a specified quality 
level, and any seller with units to sell is free to accept or not accept the bid. Likewise, anyone wishing 
to sell a unit is free to make a verbal offer to sell one unit at a specified price and quality level. If a 
bid or offer is accepted, a binding contract has been closed for a single unit at the specified price 
and quality level, and the contracting parties will record the contract price and quality level. Any 
ties in bids or acceptances will be resolved by random choice. Except for the bids and their acceptance 
or cancellation you are not to speak to any other subject. There are likely to be many bids that are 
not accepted, but you are free to keep trying. You are free to make as much profit as you can. 
Trading period 0 will be a trial period to familiarize you with the procedure, and will not count 
toward your cash earnings. 
Final Observations 
1. Each period there will be exactly three sellers offering Supers and three sellers offering Regulars. 
Which sellers offer Supers and Regulars has been determined independently and randomly each period. 
2. Each individual has a large folder. All papers, instructions, records, etc. should be put into this 
folder. Leave the folder with us before leaving. Take nothing home with you. 
3. We are able to advise you a little on making money. First, you should remember that pennies 
add up. Over many trades and a long period of time very small amounts earned on individual trades 
can add up to a great deal of money. Secondly, you should not expect your earnings to be steady. 
You will have some good periods and some bad periods. During bad times try not to become 
frustrated. Just stay in there and keep trying to earn what you can. It all adds up in the end. 
Some people rush to trade. Others find it advantageous to "shop" or spread their trading over the 
period. We are unaware of any particular "best" strategies and suggest that you adapt accordingly. 
The record forms sometimes lead people to think in terms of "markup" and "markdown" strategies. 
While we see no general problems here, they can lead to occasional mistakes in computing the returns 
from decisions. 
4. Under no circumstances may you mention anything about activities which might involve you 
and other participants after the experiment (i.e., no physical threats, deals to split up afterwards, or 
leading questions). 
5. Each individual will be paid in private. Your earnings are strictly your own business. 
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TABLE 
IA 
Buyer 
Period(s) 
Seller_ 
_ 
Seller_ 
_ 
Table 
I 
Periods_ 
Periods_ 
Quality 
Additional 
Value 
of 
Table: 
REGULAR 
Table: 
SUPER 
Quality 
Value 
last 
Quality 
Level 
Quality 
Cost 
Quality 
Cost 
Quality 
Cost 
Quality 
Cost 
0 
$0.00 
0 
0.00 
50 
7.50 
0 
0.00 
51 
1.02 
1 
0.20 
0.20 
1 
0.15 
51 
7.65 
1 
0.02 
52 
1.04 
2 
0.39 
0.19 
2 
0.3  
52 
7.80 
2 
0.04 
53 
1.06 
19 
2:09 
0.02 
47 
7.05 
98 
14:70 
48 
0.96 
99 
1.98 
20 
2.10 
0.01 
48 
7.20 
99 
14.85 
49 
0.98 
100 
2.00 
21 
2.11 
0.01 
49 
7.35 
100 
15.00 
50 
1.0  
Each 
additional 
quality 
level, 
cost=0.15. 
For 
example, 
for 
a 
quality 
Each 
additional 
quality 
level, 
cost=0.02. 
For 
example, 
for 
a 
quality 
48 
2:38 
0.01 
of 
2000 
the 
cost 
is 
300. 
For 
a 
quality 
of 
5000 
the 
cost 
is 
750. 
of 
2000 
the 
cost 
is 
40. 
For 
a 
quality 
of 
5000 
the 
cost 
is 
100. 
49 
2.39 
0.01 
50 
2.40 
0.01 
99 
2.89 
0.01 
100 
2.90 
0.01 
For 
Quality 
over 
100 
Value 
= 
2.90+.01 
for 
each 
level 
over 
100. 
For 
example, 
Quality 
= 
2000 
means 
Quality 
value 
= 
21.90. 
Quality 
= 
5000 
means 
Quality 
value 
= 
51.90. 
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.238 on Mon, 24 Mar 2014 17:50:12 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
PRODUCT QUALITY SIGNALING 871 
TABLE 
IA-(cont.) 
Base 
Value 
of 
Super 
Base 
Value 
of 
Regular 
SELLER. 
. 
SELLER. 
BUYE 
Y 
PERIOD 
REGULAR 
SUPER 
Unit 
I 
st 
2nd 
3rd 
4th 
5th 
Bonus 
Unit 
Unit 
Sold 
Trading 
Period 
Number 
Sold 
Trading 
Period 
Number 
I 
Base 
value 
I 
Ist 
unit 
Ist 
unit 
sale 
price 
sale 
price 
2 
Quality value 
c 
4 
1 
2 
Cost 
of 
1 
2 
Coat 
f o 
cens 
unit 
qu 
5afi,t y 
unit 
3Total 
valuefi 
(row 
1 
+ 
row 
2) 
3 
Profit 
3Profit 
_ 
(row 
I-row 
2) 
(row 
l-row 
2) 
4 
Price 
paid 
I2nd 
unit 
4 
2nd 
unit 
sale 
price 
sale 
price 
Profit (row 
3-row 
4) 
2 
5 
Cost 
of_ 
x_= 
2 
5 
Cost 
of 
x_ 
cents= 
unit 
unit 
6 
Total 
per 
period 
earnings 
6 
Profit 
6 
Profit 
(row 4 
-row 
5) 
(row 
4 
-row 
5) 
7 
Total 
per 
period 
7 
Total 
per 
period 
earnings 
earnings 
Name 
Soc. 
Sec. 
No. 
Total 
Payment 
Address 
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